Showing posts with label Equity Volatility Skew. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Equity Volatility Skew. Show all posts

Monday, 27 August 2012

Equity Volatility Skew


Equity Volatility Skew

Equity Volatility Skew, sometimes called strike skew, is the measure of the disparity of option implied volatility for option contracts with different strikes but the same expiration. It is the extrapolated tangent between two given strikes implied volatility, and thus a slope.
                                                                                        
In equities, most of the time, it has a negative slope and is expressed by moneyness as the arithmetic difference between implied volatility of the 90% put option and the implied volatility of the 110% call option. It can also be expressed by strike (sticky strike, vol by constant strikes) or by delta (sticky delta, vol by delta constant).

Source: Bloomberg

Skew and Black Scholes

Existence of Strike skew is not predicted by the Black-Scholes model. Black Scholes model assumes that volatility is a property of the underlying instrument, so the same implied volatility value should be observed across all options on the same instrument.

Equity volatility skew is a consequence of empirical violations of the black Sholes stock prices return distribution assumptions. Indeed, the Black-Scholes model assumes that stock prices are lognormally distributed, which in turn implies that stock log-prices are normally distributed.


Reasons for a Skew

Empirical: Market returns are more leptokurtic than assumed in by the lognormal distribution. Market leptokurtosis would make way out-of-the-money or way in-the-money options more expensive than would be assumed by the Black-Scholes formulation. So by increasing prices for such options (and thus implied volatility), existence of implied volatility skew is a way of achieving higher prices than within the Black-Scholes model.

Statistical: Markets tend to fall harder than they rise and skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of the distribution. Being the 3rd standardized moment and representing this asymmetry, skewness expresses in a certain way the observed correlation between the move of a random process and its volatility (on this - to assess the risk neutral distribution asymmetry implied by an option, a theoretical framework or model is needed)

Behavourial: Volatility skew could reflect investors fear of market crashes, as deeply out of the money puts are a form of insurance against market crashes. As they are considered as low cost in terms of dollars, deeply out of the money puts are widely used as a protection tools. Thus, skew can be seen as the perceived tail risk of the distribution of the market and can be a valuable indicator that shows the market sentiment toward a given underlying.

Structural Demand and Supply: The market is ‘long stock’, so investors naturally tend to sell high strike calls options (to enhance the yield of the portfolio through income) and to buy puts options in order to protect the portfolio returns.


Use of the skew:

The first thing is that there is not a single measure of equity volatility skew that is unambiguously best for all purposes. In fact, skew is dependent from volatility level, maturity, spot price. A very interesting way of expressing skew is (25 delta put volatility-25 delta call volatility) / 50 delta volatility, which emerges as the preferred skew measure based on the theoretical and empirical analysis.

Predictive power of returns: Academics tend to suggest that there is predictive information content within the volatility skew, especially in the short-term for stock market returns. However, market practitioners tend to make no money from such findings. So it seems that there is no clear empirical relationship... Sorry guys.

There have been many attempts in the academic literature to model the behavior of changes in skew, but the interpretation of skew information by traders is still done largely on a qualitative and ad hoc basis.


Trading Skew

An experienced trader explained me a rule of thumb, 10 delta difference between 2 options should roughly equate to 1 vol difference. Skew will be expensive if above 1.5 and cheap if below 0.5.

Risk Reversals, Put Spreads and Call Spreads are skew trading strategies. The main drawbacks when entering such king of strategy is that realisation of the skew will be impacted by vol level and spot level, so a decent amount of noise will come affect the trade. As the trade is done, moneyless/delta of the options is affected by the spot and/or volatility changes and passage of time.

Also, when trading short term options (less than 3m, for example) most of skew buying strategies tend to have poor gamma/theta ratios. In other words owning gamma via puts with high skews can be expensive in terms of theta decay compared to a portfolio made up of at-the-money or call options.

Wednesday, 15 August 2012

Game On (Tail risk in European Equities)



Today, I was wondering how much of tail risk is priced in the market at the moment. EURUSD currency pair provides one of the purest way of trading a potential Euro Zone breakup, while European stocks are my natural underlying (because of my job).

Tail risk is cheap on a 5 year relative basis in FX and damn cheap in equities.
     -       EURUSD: 6M 25D Butterfly: Currently in 24th percentile on 5Y history
     -       Eurostoxx 50:
-      6M Put Skew (90%-100%) currently in 9th percentile on 5Y history
-   6M Call Skew (100%-110%) currently in 7th percentile on 5Y history

Most of the person I talk to believe that the probability of a breakup of the euro through exit of Greece is  non-negligible. Some of them even consider as pretty much already done. So I have a hard time reconciling the idea of a Euro break up (a true tail risk event, from my view) and low implied volatility. 

Indeed, it is not very clear how a country can leave (or be forced to leave) the eurozone from a legal and practical point of view. We have a very interesting paper which won the Wolfson Prize on this topic, stating that ‘Overall, () analysis has revealed a series of very tricky issues which any exiting country would need to face” “but all of these difficulties can be overcome”.

In Summary, a country, such as Greece, contemplating leaving the euro would have to keep its plans secret until the last minute, introduce capital controls, start printing a new currency only after formal exit, implement last-minute bank holidays, seek a large depreciation (30/50%), default on its debts (note: redomination of debt may not automatically lead to default as it depends on lex monetae and contractual intentions, especially for countries that have issued debt under domestic law), recapitalise bust banks and seek close co-operation with remaining euro members. 

“Such a rebalancing of the economy away from reliance on net exports would be in the interests of the whole of the current membership of the eurozone, as well as countries outside it,” according to the paper. Nice.

Moreover, an exit also means heavy losses for debt holders as debt is likely to be re-denominated in the depreciated new currency. One-Off public costs of a euro area exit for European counterparts of Greece (from The Economist) in Eur would be 323bn:
     -       Aid package                           50bn
     -       Disbursements in bails outs    127bn
     -       Govt bonds held by ECB         40bn
     -       Target2 debt                          106bn

Talking about tail risk, I found an interesting note by Bank of America-Merrill Lynch on game theory and euro breakup risk premium published in July12. It explains that an uncooperative outcome dominates the strategies of both Germany and Greece (this is why we are stuck for the last 2 years). The paper also explains that in looking at output growth, borrowing cost, balance sheet impacts, Italy and Ireland are the two countries benefiting most from a voluntary exit of euro. Germany, despite being the most likely to leave, has the lowest incentive to do so due to negative impact on growth and loss from debt holding. So the game of Germany would be to ‘bribe’ Italy to stay.

However, the Nash equilibrium of the game would be an exit of Italy regardless of what Germany does. This sounds a bit extreme. However, I try to keep in mind that the world is much more violent than what we would like to think and outcomes much more volatile than predicted in our models.

So I do not understand why tail risk is currently priced so low, if we consider the implications of a euro break up: sorting out the uncertainties and taking the losses.

The only thing I can think about is QE and/or a weaker Euro… A recent survey of fund managers showed that 80% of fund managers see ECB doing QE in Q3/Q4. So SX5E Call Spreads are really cheap then?


References

http://www.economist.com/node/21560252